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Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper examines the effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the 
capital structure decisions of Chinese listed firms.  
 
Design/Methodology 
Using a large and more recent dataset consisting of 2386 Chinese listed firms over 
the period from 1998 to 2012, we employ panel data and use different statistical 
methods (OLS, fixed effects, and system GMM) to analyse the effects of firm-specific 
and corporate governance influences on capital structure. 
 
Findings 
We find that the proportion of independent directors and ownership concentration 
exert significant influence on the level of Chinese long-term debt ratios after 
controlling for firm-specific determinants and split share reforms. Further analysis 
separating our sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately- owned 
enterprises (POEs) suggests that ownership concentration in the hands of the state 
leads to decrease in debt ratios.  
 
Implications 
The finding implies that concentrated ownership in the hands of the state appears 
more efficient compared to their private counterparts in their monitoring role.  
 
Original Value 
This study extends prior literature, which has concentrated disproportionately on 
firm-specific influences on capital structure, to the effects of within-firm governance 
mechanisms on capital structure decisions. The paper contributes to the agency 
theory-capital structure discourse in an emerging country context where corporate 
governance system appears weak. 
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1. Introduction 
Capital structure decisions are among the most crucial corporate policy choices 
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made by managers of a firm. This is because capital structure decisions are more 
prone to agency problems, affect the riskiness and performance of a firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the quality of corporate governance plays an important 
role in a firm’s financing choices as these decisions are made by senior managers with 
the board of directors having the responsibility of supervising and monitoring these 
decisions. However, emerging country firms are dominated by ownership 
concentrated in the hand of the state and often characterised by weak corporate 
governance systems which affect how firms are monitored (Zhou et al., 2015; 
Dharwadkar et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999). Zhou et al. (2015) note that when the 
emerging governments privatise state firms they generally retain controlling interests 
suggesting that corporate investment and financing decisions may be influenced by 
governments (see, Firth et al., 2008). Environments characterised by strong corporate 
governance provide a remedy to many agency problems (Mande et al., 2012; Berger 
et al., 1997). Conversely, firms in emerging economies which operate in weak 
corporate governance environments can influence a wide spectrum of business 
decisions that often result in higher agency costs (Yuan et al., 2009).  
In this paper, we extend prior literature of emerging country firms which has 
focused predominantly on leverage decisions on firm-specific factors (see Booth et al., 
2001; Chen, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006) by examining how within-firm governance 
mechanisms influence the capital structure decisions of Chinese-listed firms. 
Specifically, we test the effects of within-firm governance on the long-term debt 
ratios of Chinese firms and carry out further analysis on the difference between the 
 2 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) and private owned enterprises (POEs).  
As the world’s largest emerging economy, China has reformed and transformed 
itself from centrally planned socialist economy to a largely market-oriented economy. 
The transformation includes corporate governance reforms in 2001; the establishment 
of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991 respectively. 
Despite the above reforms, China presents unique challenges for corporate 
governance practices for several reasons. First, Chinese firms, like their counterparts 
in other emerging countries, are noted for their lack of transparency and suffer from 
widespread corruption in the corporate sector. China is ranked 80th out of 178 
countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and collusion 
between individual businesses and agents of the state are rampant (Haß et al., 2014). 
Second, the institutional differences that exist between developed countries and China 
are significant. According to Rajagopalan and Zhang (2008), the differences in 
ownership structure, business practices and enforcement standards result in major 
gaps between the formal adoption of progressive governance codes and the actual 
implementation of these codes. While Chinese regulators may be quick to adopt best 
corporate governance practices from the West, the establishment of these practices 
and their implementation remain contested (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). We 
consider the effects of internal governance mechanisms (i.e., ownership concentration, 
CEO duality, and the percentage of independent directors) on capital structure choice 
in China because of the rudimentary level of legal protection given to shareholders in 
China compared to Western standards and the highly concentrated nature of 
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ownership and weak corporate governance among institutions (Yuan et al., 2009). 
Consistent with the agency theory, we argue that the monitoring role of dominant 
shareholders and independent directors can potentially mitigate managers’ 
self-serving behaviour, and improve firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). 
This study contributes to the capital structure literature, which has concentrated 
disproportionately on firm-specific influences with relatively little attention being 
given to the effects of within-firm governance mechanisms on capital structure 
decisions. To the best of knowledge, only two studies, that is, Chang et al. (2014) and 
Wen et al. (2002) have examined the impact of corporate governance variables and 
capital structure decisions. However, Chang et al. (2014) analysed the impact of 
ownership types on capital structure over the period of 1998-2009 and did not 
consider the effects of within-firm governance mechanisms such as CEO duality and 
independent directors on capital structure decisions. The work of Wen et al. (2002) 
considered the effects of corporate governance mechanisms using a sample of 60 
Chinese firms over the period of 1996-1998 but before the split-share reforms in 2001 
and 2005. The above is against the backdrop that Feinerman (2007); Wang, (2007) 
argue that governance problems resulting from insider control and weak independence 
of the board of directors often characterize the corporate governance practices and 
policies of Chinese listed firms. The earlier study of Chen (2004) recognized the 
importance of institutions and called for studies involving variables which reflect 
governance and institutional influences on capital structure decisions. Mande et al. 
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(2012) echoed similar views and pointed out that the existence of insider control and 
weak corporate governance system in emerging countries has implications for agency 
costs and the choice of financing. Responding to the call, this study contributes to the 
agency theory-capital structure discourse in an emerging country context where 
corporate governance system appears weak. To our knowledge, this study represents 
one of the first attempts to contribute to the literature on the effects of corporate 
governance on capital structure decisions by using a relatively larger and more recent 
dataset consisting of 2,386 Chinese listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2012. 
 
We do so by employing panel data and use different statistical methods (OLS, fixed 
effects, and system GMM) to examine the effects of within-firm governance on 
capital structure to overcome endogeneity problem often associated with board effect 
variables (Boateng and Huang, 2017). The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows. The next section reviews background literature on the corporate governance 
reforms in China, a brief theoretical perspective of capital structure determinants and 
the hypotheses of study. Section three describes the data and methodology used in this 
study. Section four presents and discusses the results. Section five provides 
conclusions. 
 
2. Corporate Governance Background in China 
2.1 Corporate Governance Development 
The last three decades has seen gradual but systematic economic reforms and 
integration of China into the world economy. With increasing integration and 
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globalisation, China’s political leadership quickly recognised the need for Chinese 
firms to adopt international practices and good corporate governance rules to increase 
trade, economic ties with other countries and improve the corporate culture (Haß et al., 
2014). As a result, a number of laws and regulations designed to improve corporate 
governance standards were passed by the Chinese government. Following the 
establishment of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, China passed its first 
Company Law in 1993, which became effective in 1994. In 1999, the Chinese 
Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) modified the 1993 law to highlight the 
importance of independent directors. However, the law fell short in several respects. 
For example, the appointment of independent directors applied only to overseas-listed 
firms and not domestic firms. For domestic-listed firms, the concept of independent 
directors was first introduced in the Guidelines on Company Chapter of Listed 
Companies (CSRC, 1997) as an optional provision in which a listed firm may appoint 
independent directors if necessary. CSRC (1997) specifies persons who may not hold 
the position of independent director, but the guidelines remain silent on the minimum 
number and the duties of independent directors (CSRC, 1997: p.117). In 1998, China 
enacted the Securities Law to regulate the stock markets. The Securities Law provided 
strict prohibition of unfair practices such as market manipulation and insider trading. 
A formal and comprehensive corporate governance code on independent directors was 
released in 2001. This law specifies several requirements for listed companies, such as 
the presence of independent directors on boards, adherence to strict information 
disclosure norms, and the protection of the rights of minority shareholders. In addition, 
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the 2001 law established that independent directors should consist of at least one third 
of board members by June 30, 2003 (CSRC, 2001). The law also provided the 
guidelines concerning the rights, responsibilities, and liabilities of different groups 
such as shareholders, boards of directors, and managers. In 2005, further governance 
reforms including non-tradable share reforms followed. 
Despite the reforms and recognition that corporate governance practices are 
crucially important for firms and investment growth in China, it appears that China 
has a long way to go before its corporate governance systems meet the Western 
standards. For example, according to a 2002 McKinsey Investor Opinion Survey, 
investors on average are willing to pay a 25% premium for well-governed Chinese 
firms (Barton et al., 2004). In addition, a report by Asian Corporate Governance 
Association (Gill and Allen, 2007) placed China near the bottom in governance 
standards among 11 Asian markets. Other recent studies such as Qian and Yeung 
(2015) support the contention that weak corporate governance system permeates the 
corporate culture in China. 
 
3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Determinants of capital structure have been explained by three theoretical models, 
namely, the static trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and agency theory. The 
static trade-off theory states that a value-maximising firm will pursue an optimal 
capital structure by considering the marginal costs and benefits of each additional unit 
of financing, choosing the combination of debt and equity financing that equates 
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marginal costs and benefits (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Under the trade-off theory the 
optimal capital structure is determined by balancing tax savings from debt against the 
bankruptcy costs. In contrast, the pecking order theory suggests a preference sequence 
for firms’ financing choice because of the existence of information asymmetry (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). Accordingly, new investments are financed first by retained profits, 
then by low risk debt if internally generated funds prove insufficient, and external 
equity as a last resort. Under the pecking order theory, changes in debt ratios are 
driven by the need for external funds, not by an attempt to reach an optimal capital 
structure (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1991).  
Prior literature examining the relationship between corporate governance and capital 
structure have drawn extensively on agency theory to explain the financing decisions 
of a firm (e.g. Friend and Lang, 1988; Berger et al., 1997; Wen et al., 2002). One line 
of research examines the effects of corporate governance on leverage decisions from 
the lens of principal-principal conflict (see Faccio et al., 2010; Morellec et al., 2012; 
Liu and Tian, 2012). These studies argue that ownership of listed firms in emerging 
countries are concentrated in the hands of large shareholders often SOEs (La Porta et 
al., 1999; Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Concentrated ownership coupled with the absence 
of effective external governance mechanisms leads to conflicts between the 
controlling and minority shareholders in financing decisions (Liu and Tian, 2012; 
Boateng and Huang, 2017). For example, Faccio et al. (2010) demonstrate how firm 
leverage in countries with a weak legal system enables controlling shareholders to 
deploy borrowed resources for their own benefits at the expense of minority 
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shareholders without bearing fully the financial distress cost. Paligorova and Xu 
(2012) therefore point out that higher leverage provides resources for controlling 
shareholders with excess control rights to engage in tunnelling activities. In addition, 
higher leverage is related to higher risk, higher cost of capital and heightens chances 
of financial distress (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Thus the above studies indicate 
that the principal-principal conflicts affect a firm’s financing decisions and value. 
An alternative perspective is that managers make capital structure decisions to 
increase their own wealth at the expense of debtholders and shareholders. It is 
therefore argued that capital structure decision of a firm is influenced not only by 
firm-specific factors and market frictions such as firm size, asset tangibility, earnings 
volatility, bankruptcy cost and tax but also by the severity of manager-shareholder 
conflict (Wen et al., 2002; Morellec et al., 2012). Consequently, a number of studies 
have focused on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms such as 
board size, managerial ownership, CEO compensation, board composition and 
corporate financing decisions of firms mostly in the context of developed market 
economies where ownership of firms is widely dispersed with relatively good 
corporate governance systems. Overall, prior literature emphasises the importance of 
internal corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms in reducing agency 
problems. For example, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) argue that good corporate 
governance systems lessen agency costs and the cost of debt financing. This is 
because effective corporate governance mechanisms lead to efficient utilization of 
resources by managers, reduce default risk, thereby lowering the cost of debt. In 
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summary, effective governance alleviates information asymmetry by ensuring the 
release of credible financial information (Ajinkya et al. 2005) and restrains managers 
from using private information for their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders/bondholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers and Majluf 1984). A 
number of studies have rendered some support for the above contention and indicate 
that corporate governance structures play a significant role in the capital structure 
decisions of listed firms (Morellec et al., 2012).  
In the context of China, Wen et al. (2002) study is one of the first attempts to examine 
the relationship between corporate board characteristics and the capital structure of 
Chinese listed firms. Wen et al. (2002) found lower levels of leverage to be associated 
with the percentage of outside directors and longer CEO tenure but statistically 
insignificant relationship between board size and fixed CEO compensation. The 
results that lower leverage is associated with the percentage of outside directors and 
CEO tenure appear consistent with the findings of Berger et al. (1997). In contrast, 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1980) found significant relationship between leverage and both 
board size and composition. It is important to point out that the study by Wen et al. 
(2002) was carried before the split share reforms in 2005 and also did not consider the 
ownership concentration and CEO duality. Given the relatively weak corporate 
governance systems in China where high ownership concentration and state 
ownership are prevalent (La Porta et al., 1999), we believe that the agency cost 
perspective provides a valuable insight into how firms are financed. Drawing from 
agency theory, we formulate the following hypotheses.  
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 3.1 Ownership Concentration 
It is documented that concentrated ownership has a palpable impact on a firm’s 
financing decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is argued that ownership 
concentration leads to efficient monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The effect of 
ownership concentration on a firm’s financial decisions is premised on the fact that 
higher concentration gives large shareholders stronger incentives and greater power to 
monitor management at a lower cost. This argument is consistent with the view of 
Grossman and Hart (1986) who contend that shareholders with a large stake in the 
company show more willingness to play an active role in corporate decision-making 
because they partially internalize the benefits of their monitoring efforts. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) suggest that ownership concentration helps in disciplining managers 
and improves firm value, even in the presence of insufficient legal protections. 
Efficient monitoring may reduce managerial entrenchment and cause managers to 
reduce leverage as entrenched managers tend to borrow more than optimal amount of 
debt in order to inflate their voting power to reduce possibility of takeover attempts 
(Harris and Raviv, 1988). Wen et al. (2002) in the study of 60 Chinese listed firms 
tentatively concluded that managers seek lower leverage when faced with stronger 
monitoring. In light of the argument, we hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 1: Ownership concentration is negatively related to the long-term debt 
ratio of Chinese firms. 
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3.2 Independent Directors 
Agency theory suggests that the monitoring of management is enhanced by 
outside and independent directors. Prominent among the studies that document the 
effectiveness of independent directors in monitoring managerial actions regarding the 
firms’ corporate financing decisions include Lin et al. (1998); Feinerman (2007). 
These studies argue that senior managers are rigorously monitored when independent 
or outside directors constitute a higher proportion of board of directors thereby 
causing managers to adopt lower leverage to avoid excessive risk and disciplining role 
associated with debt. Thus, agency theory suggests that the relationship between a 
higher proportion of independent directors and long-term debt ratios will be negative 
while the converse has a positive effective.  
In the context of China, Knowledge@Wharton (2007) point out that it is difficult 
for Chinese firms to get the services of qualified independent directors because of the 
limited availability of such directors. Dharwadkar et al. (2000) and Feinerman (2007) 
share similar views and point out that most Chinese firms have weak independent 
boards of directors due to lack of capacity. Moreover, firm leadership/board in China 
reflects the characteristics of Chinese society: its collectivist culture, social harmony, 
socialist politics and the associated political connections (Chen et al., 2011). The 
boards of Chinese firms are predominantly insiders with political connections as most 
Chinese listed companies have evolved from state owned enterprises (SOEs). Board 
of directors are often undermined by its composition and truly independent directors 
appear to be few and ineffective (Dahya et al., 2003; Wang, 2007). In the light of the 
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above argument, we hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2: Long term debt ratio is positively related to the percentage of outside 
directors on the board. 
3.3 CEO Duality 
Mallette and Fowler (1992) argue that CEO duality leads to the concentration of 
the power in the hands of one person thereby rendering the board’s monitoring role 
ineffective. Empirical evidence suggests that strong CEO power promotes CEO 
entrenchment and diminishes the ability of the board to execute its oversight role 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Fama (1980) argue that entrenched managers may 
prefer less leverage than optimal amount because of a desire to reduce firm risk to 
protect their under-diversified human capital. In line with the above reasoning, we 
expect a negative relationship between CEO duality and long-term debt ratios.   
Hypothesis 3: Long term debt ratio is negatively related to CEO duality. 
 
3.4 Firm-Specific Control Variables 
We control a number of firm-specific variables which prior literature on capital 
structure indicate have explanatory power on capital structure decisions under both 
static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. These include: 
Firm Size: Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that larger firms tend to be more 
diversified and are less likely to go bankrupt. The lower risk of bankruptcy and the 
ability of large firms to issue debt at a lower cost enable them to take on more debt 
than otherwise identical smaller firms.  
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Asset Tangibility: Previous studies by Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) have shown that tangibility of assets is an important factor 
influencing leverage.  
Profitability: The pecking-order theory suggests a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage. Consistent with this theory, Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) found profitability to be inversely related to financial 
leverage. 
Non Debt Tax Shield: DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that non-debt tax shields 
are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. As a result, firms with larger 
non-debt tax shields would be expected to use less debt. Huang and Song (2006) find 
total debt to be negatively related to non-debt tax shields in China. 
Growth Opportunities (Tobin’s Q): Titman and Wessels (1988) point out that the 
agency problems are likely to be more severe for firms in growing industries because 
they have more flexibility in the choice of their future investment opportunities. As a 
result, a negative relationship between growth (investment) opportunities and 
financial leverage is expected.  
Earnings Volatility: Leverage increases the volatility of net profit. Firms that have 
high operating risk tend to mitigate this risk by reducing the level of debt. 
Split Share Structure Reform: A number of authors argue that because of the split 
share structure, stock markets in China are illiquid and firms rely heavily on debt 
financing (Berger et al., 2009). In April 2005-December, 2007, Chinese government 
carried out a split share reforms to improve the liquidity in Chinese stock marks and 
reduce transaction costs of equity finance. In recent study, Tsai et al. (2014) 
 14 
demonstrate that the split share structure reforms decrease debt ratios of Chinese firms. 
We control for the effect of split share structure reforms using s dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 equals the years after the split structure reform; 0 equals 
otherwise.  
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
The data for this study was obtained from the Chinese Stock Market Research 
(CSMAR) databases, commercially available at Shenzhen GTA Information 
Technology Company Ltd. CSMAR is a premier Chinese database jointly produced 
by the University of Hong-Kong and GTA and the database covers the governance 
and finance structure of listed Chinese mainland firms. The following restrictions 
were imposed in order to arrive at the final sample: (1) firms with any missing 
observations for any variable in the model during the period 1998–2012 are excluded. 
(2) firms in the financial sector are excluded from the sample because of the nature of 
their operations and financial reporting system. The above restrictions led to a final 
sample of 2386 Chinese-listed firms out of the initial sample of 2580 on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
 
4.2 Variables Measurement 
Our dependent variable is the firm’s long-term debt ratio (LLEV) which is 
defined as long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus the book value of equity. 
The explanatory variables include profitability, size, growth opportunities, tangibility, 
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earnings volatility, non-debt tax shields, split-share reforms, CEO duality, 
independent directors and ownership concentration. The manners in which the 
variables in this study are measured are provided in Table 1.  
  
      (Insert Table 1 here) 
4.3 Empirical Model 
Following previous studies that examine the determinants of firm capital structure 
choice (e.g. Huang and Song, 2006; Chen, 2004), we employed OLS and fixed effects 
models in this article. Hsiao (1985) argues that the use of panel data provides a greater 
data points and improve the efficiency of econometrics estimates. For example, 
incorporating information relating to both cross-section and time-series variables 
reduce the problems that occur when there is an omitted-variable problem because it 
is unlikely that the capital structure models are fully specified (Guney et al., 2011). 
Previous studies point out that, for example, there are no available proxies for such 
factors such as industry effects or magnitude of financial distress costs. However, 
using fixed effects method would potentially control for the unobservable 
firm-specific factors but it would not alleviate the endogeneity problem (Istaitieg and 
Rodriguez, 2006). To mitigate the distortions caused by fixed effects, and the 
endogeneity problem, we also use system-GMM (SGMM).  
The basic model is specified as follows: 
      𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝑖𝑖 = 1, … 1681;  𝑡𝑡 = 1 … 11        (1) 
where i denotes the cross-section dimension and t indicates the time dimension, 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
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is a 1 x k vector of observations on k explanatory variables for the ith firm in the tth 
period, β is a k x 1 vector of parameters, itu  is a disturbance term and is defined as 
itiitu νµ +=  where iµ  denotes the unobservable individual effect and itν  denotes 
the remainder disturbance. 
 
4.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 summarises the mean, standard deviation and a correlation matrix. All 
correlations are relatively low and variance inflation factor (VIF) is below the 
acceptable level of 10. This correlation matrix suggests that multicollinearity does not 
appear to be a problem in this study. The mean book value debt ratio of Chinese listed 
firms is about 53% compared to the mean of 66% for G-7 countries (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). However, the Chinese debt ratio appears to be slightly higher than 
the average total book value debt level of 51% in developing countries overall (Booth 
et al., 2001). Independent directors in the sample constitute about 35% of the 
proportion of board members and CEO duality is about 14%. The proportion of equity 
concentrated among the top 5 shareholders is about 38%. 
 
       (Insert Table 2 here) 
 
5. Regression Results 
5.1 OLS and Fixed Effects Results 
Table 3 reports the regression results using both the OLS and fixed effects (FE) 
estimation techniques. For the corporate governance variables, both OLS and FE 
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results suggest that the ownership concentration and proportion of independent 
directors exert significant negative and positive influence on the level of debt utilised 
by Chinese listed firms at respectively. The fixed effect model (ownership 
concentration: β = -0.0004399; p<0.01) and (independent directors: β = 0.0161625; 
p<0.01) are negatively and positively significant, respectively. These results are 
similar to the OLS model. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are therefore supported by the OLS and 
FE models. The coefficient for CEO duality for both OLS and FE (β = -0.0302463; 
β= -0.0078555; p<0.01) is negatively and significantly related to the debt ratio 
rendering some support for Hypothesis 3.  
Regarding the control variables, we find firm size (β = 1.21e-10; p<0.01) and 
asset tangibility (β = 0.05431; p<0.01) have positive coefficient while profitability (β 
= -5.53e-07; p<0.01); and split share reforms (β = -0.0199986; p<0.01) have negative 
and significant influence on long-term debt ratio. Both OLS and FE results indicate 
that firm size (SIZE) and firms with higher collateral (TANG) tend to borrow more 
debt suggesting that large firms and firms with tangible assets reduce lender’s risk 
because of diversification and the use of assets as collateral. Regarding the split 
structure reform, our results suggest that the split-share reform has a negative and 
significant effect on the debt ratio of Chinese listed firms. However, earnings 
volatility and growth opportunities have insignificant influence on the use of 
long-term debt. It is pertinent to point out that the results imply that the magnitude 
and significant levels of coefficient estimates are in some cases sensitive to the choice 
of econometric method. For example, while OLS reveal that profitability is not 
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significantly related to the debt ratio, the FE shows that profitability is significantly 
related to long-term debt at the 1% level.  
 
  (Insert Table 3 here please) 
 
5.2 System GMM (SGMM) Results  
The previous section assumed that capital structure choice of Chinese firms is 
static. However, a more realistic assumption would be that managers adjust their 
financing mix due to internal changes or external shocks (see Antoniou et al., 2008). 
Our SGMM estimation accounts for such considerations and the results are reported 
in Table 4. While OLS and fixed effects methods produce slightly different results, 
the SGMM results based on dynamic capital structure analysis settle the 
contradictions. The findings of the SGMM regression indicate that internal 
governance mechanisms influence the choice of capital structure in China. The 
ownership concentration (β = -0.0087401; p<0.05) and independent directors (β = 
0.0174638; p<0.05) exert a significant negative and positive influence on the level of 
Chinese long-term debt ratios, respectively. The positive relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors and level of long-term debt for Chinese listed 
firms suggests that the presence of independent directors increases the debt ratios of 
Chinese firms. The results call into question the effectiveness of the monitoring role 
of independent directors in the Chinese firm financial decisions (see Dahya et al., 
2003). Another interesting finding is the negative relationship between ownership 
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concentration and long-term debt ratios. The result appears consistent to the notion 
that ownership concentration gives large shareholders stronger incentives and greater 
power to monitor management and reduce debt levels, even if, there is a failure of the 
monitoring role of the independent directors or in the presence of a weak governance 
system (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This finding also 
appears to render support to the conclusion drawn by Boateng and Huang (2017) that 
concentrated ownership reduces the adoption of excess leverage by Chinese firms. 
However, CEO duality appears to have a negative coefficient which is insignificant.  
 
                      (Insert Table 4 here please) 
 
Regarding the control variables, our results indicate that split share reforms, firm 
size, asset tangibility and non-debt tax shields have significant influence on long-term. 
The SGMM results confirm the findings in OLS and fixed effect regression models. 
The results of the firm-specific control variables are consistent with theoretical 
predictions and the results of the previous empirical studies. The finding that firm size 
has a positive and significant impact on long-term debt ratios supports the trade-off 
model which indicates that large firms tend to have a higher debt capacity because of 
greater diversification, less risk to lenders and economies of scale. The positive and 
significant effect of asset tangibility on debt ratio appears to support the pecking order 
theory. The positive coefficient of non-tax debt shields (NDTS) seems to render some 
support to the findings of Bradley et al. (1984) and is in line with the trade-off theory. 
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However, this result is at variance with that of Huang and Song (2006) who found that 
the Chinese firms’ debt ratios decrease with NDTS. The relationship between the 
long-term debt ratio and volatility is negative and insignificantly different from zero. 
This result is also at odds with the results of previous research (Booth et al., 2001). 
Profitability has a negative and significant effect on debt ratio suggesting that higher 
profitability (ROA) tends to increase debt ratio for Chinese firms. This finding is 
consistent to the findings of Chen (2004) and supports the pecking order theory. We 
find that growth opportunity (Tobin’s Q) appears not to have a significant impact on 
the debt ratio of Chinese listed firms contrary to the findings of Huang and Song 
(2006) who document a negative and significant influence of Tobin’s Q on debt ratio 
for Chinese firms. The split share structure reform appears to have a negative and 
significant influence on debt ratio. Perhaps the results may be explained by the fact 
that, after the reform, the liquidity of the stock market improved as non-tradable 
shares were converted into tradable shares thereby reducing the reliance of debt 
finance from banks which dominate Chinese financial markets (see Berger et al., 
2009). 
   
5.3 Further Analysis: SOEs versus POEs 
Previous studies indicate state ownership is an important feature in China despite 
massive reforms (Du and Boateng, 2015). To shed lights on the effects of ownership 
type and seek direct evidence to strengthen our interpretation of the effect of 
ownership concentration on debt ratio, we carried out a sub-sample analysis. We do 
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so by dividing the sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned 
enterprises (POEs) for the following reasons. First, ownership structure represents a 
source of power in a firm and can be used to either support or constrain corporate 
finance decisions and influence firm value (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980; Du and 
Boateng, 2015). Second, ownership concentration in the hands of state ownership and 
private ownership may have different implications for capital structure decisions. It is 
argued that SOEs tend to be politically rather than commercially motivated, which 
might induce soft budget constraints and provide some support for state controlled 
firms (Poncet et al., 2010). Soft budget constraints may provide easier access to 
external finance for firms and it is documented that SOEs have less financial 
constraints compared to POEs in China (Zhou et al., 2015). We therefore test whether 
there are variations in the impact of factors influencing the financing choice according 
to ownership types in China. 
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that whereas the ownership concentration 
has a negative and significant influence on the debt ratios of SOEs, this appears not be 
the case of POEs. This appears surprising because it was anticipated that SOEs in 
China which tend to have political objectives might induce soft budget constraints and 
provide some support for state controlled firms as pointed out by Poncet et al. (2010). 
However, this appears not be the case. Perhaps, this finding may be explained by the 
fact that ownership concentration in the hands of the state has a better capacity to 
perform effective monitoring role thereby providing an efficient way of resolving 
agency problems between managers and shareholders in Chinese firms compared to 
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POEs (see Chen et al., 2009). Another plausible explanation is that the state may prop 
up firms in which they have dominant shares through grants or increase in equity 
capital rather than the use of debt capital due to the political and social goals 
associated with these firms. 
 
      (Inset Table 5 here please) 
 
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
To check for the overall robustness of the empirical results, we implement a number 
of robustness checks on our main results in Tables 3 & 4. First, we explore alternative 
measures of return on equity for profitability and the natural log of sales for firm size. 
Our analysis suggests the results are not sensitive to the changes in measurements of 
variables. As a further check on the validity of our interpretations, the study employed 
a regression specification that used overall leverage (LEV) as dependent variable. The 
results which are not reported here but available upon request are similar to that 
obtained in Table 3 and 4. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper employs within-firm governance mechanisms and control 
firm-specific factors to investigate the capital structure decisions of 2386 Chinese 
listed firms. This paper reports some interesting and significant results. First, we find 
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that within-firm governance mechanisms, namely, independent directors and 
ownership concentration have significant impact on the debt ratio of Chinese listed 
firms. The positive and significant relationship between the independent directors and 
long-term debt ratio indicates that the proportion of independent directors increases 
with long-term debt ratio in China. An important implication of this finding is that 
independent directors who have an institutional mandate to monitor the board in 
China appear to be less effective in their monitoring role, perhaps due to lack of 
capacity as suggested by Dahya et al. (2003). We suggest that, firms should not only 
engage qualified personnel as directors but resource them with requisite training 
through refresher courses to make them more capable of carrying out their monitoring 
mandate. To the policy makers, we suggest that the proportion of independent 
directors should be increased from one-third to one-half of board members in line 
with many advanced countries such as the United Kingdom. 
Regarding the negative relationship between the ownership concentration and 
long-term debt ratios, this finding implies that concentrated ownership leads to 
efficient monitoring and in particular, concentration in the hands of SOEs appears 
more efficient compared to their counterparts in POEs in their monitoring role. It 
appears concentration of ownership in the hands of the state which has a capacity to 
finance these firms internally for political and social objectives. This implies that 
despite substantial improvements in the governance environment and enterprise 
reforms in China, the state plays a key role in financing decisions of Chinese listed 
firms.  
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Regarding the influence of firm-specific determinants of capital structure, our 
results suggest that size and asset tangibility exert positive and significant influence 
on the debt ratios of Chinese firms. However, growth opportunity and earnings 
volatility appear not to have significant impact on long-term debt ratios of Chinese 
listed firms. The study also extends the previous studies in emerging countries such as 
Chen (2004) and Huang and Song (2006) by examining the capital structure choice 
after major enterprise and governance reforms in the largest emerging country. The 
insights regarding these factors could help predict the financial structure of a firm in 
China and other emerging countries. While this paper has provided significant 
insights into capital structure choice of Chinese listed firms, the paper has some 
limitations. Due to the unavailability of data, SOEs in this paper refer to firms 
controlled by both central and local governments. It would have been useful to divide 
SOEs into those controlled by the central government and those controlled by local 
government as pointed out by Chen et al. (2009). More studies therefore appear 
warranted. Future studies should explore and compare the influence of corporate 
governance factors on capital structure choice among Chinese SOEs and POEs by 
distinguishing between the SOEs controlled by the central government and those 
controlled by local government.  
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